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JURISDICTIONAL HOOKS IN THE WAKE OF





When Congress casts its Commerce Clause power into the waters
of intrastate and interstate activity, Congress has two important tools
at its disposal: the jurisdictional hook and the regulatory net. The
power of the jurisdictional hook, or element,' received significant at-
tention in United States v. Lopez2 and United States v. Morrison,3 which
are often considered to mark the dawn of a "new federalism" era.
4
Lopez and Morrison conveyed to Congress that when it desires to regu-
late seemingly intrastate activity pursuant to its Commerce Clause
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.S., Journalism,
Ohio University, 2004. Many thanks to Professor Anthony J. Bellia Jr. for his
invaluable guidance and suggestions throughout the planning and editing of this
Note. I would also like to thank members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
helpful editing suggestions.
1 For purposes of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the terms jurisdictional
hook and jurisdictional element are synonymous and will be used interchangeably
throughout this Note. See, e.g., Susanna Frederick Fischer, Between Scylla and Charyb-
dis: The Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits over Whether Federal Law Criminalizing the
Intrastate Possession of Child Pornography Violates the Commerce Clause, 10 NEXUS 99
(2005) (discussing jurisdictional elements/hooks in the context of Commerce Clause
challenges and using the terms interchangeably throughout).
2 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 101-02; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Con-
servative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429,
430-31 (2002) (describing "the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival"); Daniel A. Far-
ber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2000) ("Arguably, the most startling of the recent federal-
ism rulings was United States v. Lopez, the first decision since the New Deal to hold that
Congress had exceeded its regulatory powers under the commerce clause." (footnote
omitted)).
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power, it should cast its power using a jurisdictional hook. Ajurisdic-
tional hook is a statutory clause requiring that the regulated activity
have a connection with interstate commerce. 5 This hook, the Court
reasoned, would "ensure, through case-by-case inquiry," that the regu-
lated activity has a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. 6 Essen-
tially, the presence of a jurisdictional hook would ensure that each
and every regulated activity reeled in by a given statute is a "keeper,
7
allowing courts to reject "throwbacks"8 on a case-by-case basis. Be-
cause the hook requires that every activity have a nexus to commerce,
its very presence supports the facial constitutionality of a statute. 9 The
Supreme Court found that the absence of ajurisdictional hook in the
statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison cut against the facial constitu-
tionality of those statutes. 10
Years after Lopez and Morrison, the Court in Gonzales v. Raich"
reminded Congress of a second tool at its disposal, suggesting that the
use of a jurisdictional hook is not the most effective, nor the most
efficient, method of legislating. Rather, casting a broad statutory
net 2 allows Congress to regulate any intrastate activity under a provi-
sion that Congress rationally includes within the greater statutory
scheme. In articulating what this Note will refer to as the "Raich prin-
ciple,"13 the majority held that the local cultivation of marijuana for
5 Jonathan E. Duckworth, Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty: Extending Commerce
Clause Powers to Intrastate Species by Defining the Precise Regulated Activity, 50 WAYNE L.
REV. 977, 981 n.40 (2004); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80
WASH. L. REv. 643, 679 (2005) (defining ajurisdictional element as "a fact included in
a statute that must be pled and proven by the plaintiff in each case, serving as a nexus
between a particular piece of legislation and Congress's constitutional power to enact
that legislation and to regulate the conduct at issue").
6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
7 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 683 (11th ed. 2003) (defining
"keeper" as "one suitable for or worth keeping... a fish large enough to be legally
caught and kept"); Frank Davis, Loads of Trout Available Between Grand Isle and
Lafitte (Aug. 17, 2005), http://rodnreel.com/articles/articles.asp?cmd=view&StoryID
=849.
8 Fish that are not "keepers" are often referred to as "throwbacks." See Davis,
supra note 7.
9 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
10 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
11 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
12 See id. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("So long as Congress casts its net
broadly over an interstate market, according to the majority, it is free to regulate
interstate and intrastate activity alike.").
13 This has also been referred to as the "comprehensive scheme" principle. See
Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Clear the Air: Gonzalez v. Raich, the "Compre-
hensive Scheme" Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENvrL.
L. 491, 491 (2005).
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medicinal purposes may be constitutionally prohibited under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA)14 because the activity is regulated by
a federal statutory provision that is part of a larger regulatory scheme
and Congress had a rational basis for concluding that failure to regu-
late the class of activity at issue would "undercut" the larger scheme.' 
5
Although the Court relied on the decades-old aggregation theory in
Wickard v. Filburn,16 the Raich principle is somewhat surprising in light
of the "new federalism" era marked by Lopez and Morrison. 17 Raich
gives Congress an incentive to legislate broadlyI8 by modeling statutes
after the provisions at issue in Raich, which are part of a broader statu-
tory scheme and do not contain jurisdictional elements.' 9 The unsuc-
cessful constitutional challenge in Raich raises the question of why
Congress would choose to legislate with a jurisdictional hook when it
could quickly and easily catch all intrastate and interstate activities
with a broad regulatory net.
Even if Raich leads Congress to draft more regulatory nets into
future legislation, numerous statutes already contain jurisdictional
hooks. Unlike the relevant provisions of the CSA, which did not con-
tain a jurisdictional element, the Sherman Act,20 the Racketeer Influ-
14 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-904 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005). The CSA makes it "unlaw-
ful ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess ... a controlled substance"
except in a manner authorized by the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). The CSA
groups all controlled substances into five schedules, with Schedule I drugs being sub-
ject to the most stringent controls. Id. § 812. Under the CSA, marijuana is classified
as a Schedule I drug. Id. § 812(c). The CSA was enacted under Title II of the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II,
84 Stat. 1236, 1242-48.
15 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-15.
16 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see a/soJohanna R. Shargel, Note, In
Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1849,
1859 (1997) ("Over the past sixty years, in a series of highly deferential decisions, the
Court allowed Congress free rein to regulate purely intrastate activity as long as that
activity had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce when considered in the
aggregate.").
18 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Court announces a
rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause-nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive
regulatory schemes-rather than with precision."); see supra note 12 and accompany-
ing text.
19 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Raich v.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2195. Note that the Supreme Court neglects to mention the
absence of a jurisdictional element in its opinion. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195.
20 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005). The Sherman Act applies only
to conduct that has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on
trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000).
2006] 210 3
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enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),21 the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),22 and child pornography statutes23 are just a
few examples of Congress's decision to legislate using a jurisdictional
hook to ensure a nexus to interstate commerce. If the Raich principle
applies to these statutes, their jurisdictional hooks will be rendered
meaningless; under Raich, courts may easily find that the statutes are
comprehensive schemes regulating economic activity and that Con-
gress rationally concluded that regulating intrastate activity was neces-
sary to the larger regulatory scheme. 24 Thus, even though Congress
purposely inserted a hook in many statutes, courts applying Raich to
these statutes will drown those hooks in the jumbled sea of intrastate
and interstate activity swept in by Raich's net.
Courts are currently divided as to how, if at all, Raich should ap-
ply to statutes containing jurisdictional elements. The Eleventh,
Tenth, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits have applied Raich to statutes con-
taining jurisdictional elements, catching intrastate child pornography
violations with the Raich net and dismissing the particular nexus re-
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000). RICO prohibits certain activities relating to
.any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce." Id. §§ 1962(a)-(b).
22 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The FAA applies to arbitration
clauses in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." Id. § 2 (2000).
23 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (a) (West Supp. 2005) (prohibiting production of
child pornography that has traveled in interstate commerce or that was produced
using materials that have traveled in interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (prohibiting possession of child pornography that has trav-
eled in interstate commerce or that was produced using materials that have traveled
in interstate commerce). Professor Fischer summarizes a number of child pornogra-
phy laws:
Since the 1970s, Congress has enacted and amended several child pornogra-
phy laws, which now ban, among other things, the knowing transportation
or shipment of child pornography in interstate or foreign commerce; the
knowing receipt or distribution of child pornography in interstate or foreign
commerce; and the knowing sale of child pornography that has been
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. These federal statutes also
criminalize the knowing possession of child pornography in certain
circumstances.
Fischer, supra note 1, at 100.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir.
2005) (referring to 18 U.S.C.A § 2251 (a) as a "comprehensive scheme" to regulate
child pornography without explanation as to how the court reached that conclusion),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1771 (2006); id. at 1273 (finding the rational basis requirement
satisfied); United States v. Croxford, No. 04-4158, 2006 WL 541250, at *9 (10th Cir.
Mar. 7, 2006) (applying Raich and following Jeronimo-Bautista to find that the rational
basis requirement was satisfied in § 2251 (a)).
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quired by the statutes' jurisdictional hooks. 25 Yet another court, the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, has suggested that Raich should apply
to some jurisdictional elements but not others. 26 Finally, the Second
and Ninth Circuits have distinguished Raich from cases involving chal-
lenges to statutes with jurisdictional hooks but have offered Raich to
support some degree of narrow aggregation in satisfying these
hooks.
27
This Note poses the question of what effect, if any, courts should
give to jurisdictional elements in as-applied challenges of the post-
Raich era. Part I examines the background of the jurisdictional ele-
ment, including the role its absence played in Lopez and Morrison and
the saving power ofjurisdictional elements in facial challenges. It also
discusses the extent to which courts should narrow jurisdictional ele-
ments to account for concerns of over-aggregation and constitution-
ally insufficient jurisdictional elements. Part II explores the status of
Commerce Clause challenges in the Raich era by examining the Raich
decision and the various ways it may be interpreted. Finally, Part III
calls into question the role that jurisdictional elements should play in
evaluating as-applied Commerce Clause challenges, setting forth four
possibilities for the treatment of jurisdictional elements in light of
Raich. Part III ultimately argues that courts should give meaning to
jurisdictional hooks by adopting the approach exemplified by the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits, calling on courts to distinguish Raich from
cases involving statutes with jurisdictional hooks while respecting the
effect that Raich may have on future Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Additionally, Part III suggests that courts handle potentially insuffi-
cient hooks in a flexible manner so as to give proper meaning to the
hooks and provide Congress with incentives to legislate with precision.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE JURISDICTIONAL HOOK
A. Anatomy and Purpose of the Hook
The jurisdictional hook, or element, is a statutory clause28 that
serves as a nexus between three points-a piece of legislation, Con-
gress's constitutional power to enact that legislation, and Congress's
power to regulate the particular conduct at issue.29 This simple statu-
tory clause establishes "congressional jurisdiction-substantive con-
25 See infra Part III.A.1.
26 See infra Part III.A.2.
27 See infra Part III.A.3.
28 Duckworth, supra note 5, at 981 n.40.
29 See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 679.
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gressional constitutional power or authority-to regulate particular
real-world conduct through legislation."3 0 In a Commerce Clause
context, the jurisdictional hook requires that the regulated activity or
object have a nexus to interstate commerce.3 1 To ensure this nexus, a
plaintiff must plead and prove satisfaction of the jurisdictional hook
in each case. 32 In a criminal statute, the hook becomes an element of
the crime, requiring the prosecution to prove the connection to com-
merce beyond a reasonable doubt.33
The nexus required by ajurisdictional hook serves dual and inter-
related purposes. First, on an as-applied basis, the jurisdictional ele-
ment "limit[s] the reach of a particular statute to a discrete set of
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 3 4 In this way,
jurisdictional elements preserve the viability of as-applied challenges
to their respective statutes. The jurisdictional element may preclude
application of a statute, whether criminal or civil, to certain intrastate
activity if the activity lacks the nexus to commerce required by the
language of the jurisdictional element.35 Second, this required nexus
may aid in "saving" a statute that would otherwise be found facially
unconstitutional for want of a connection to interstate commerce. 36
While the limiting function may uphold as-applied challenges to stat-
utes containing jurisdictional elements, it is that very function that
supports the facial constitutionality of many statutes.
To achieve these purposes, Congress has different types of hooks
at its disposal. Jurisdictional elements range from broad language re-
quiring that an activity "affect . . . commerce"3 7 or "involve[ ] com-
merce"38 to narrower clauses requiring that a particular piece of
property be "used in" interstate commerce or an activity "affecting"
30 Id. at 684; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) ("[A]
jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress'
regulation of interstate commerce.").
31 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
32 Wasserman, supra note 5, at 679.
33 See United States v. Allen, 129 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir. 1996);John S. Baker, Jurisdictional and Separa-
tion of Powers Strategies To Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 Am. U. L. REv. 545,
563-64 (2005); Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge "On Its
Face": Why Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 161, 210 (2004).
34 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
35 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
36 See infra Part I.B.
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (b) (2000).
38 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
21o6
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interstate commerce. 39 Other seemingly narrow statements can sweep
in nearly any activity by requiring that materials used in a particular
activity have traveled in interstate commerce. 40 The language of these
hooks serves an important function in determining the degree of ag-
gregation to be employed 41 and the extent to which the hooks fulfill
their purpose of limiting a statute's reach.
42
B. Lopez, Morrison, and the Saving Power of the Jurisdictional Hook's
Limiting Function in Facial Challenges
There is no question that the Supreme Court intends for jurisdic-
tional elements to carry significant meaning. Jurisdictional elements
have played a noteworthy role in at least four recent Supreme Court
cases determining the as-applied or facial constitutionality of a federal
statute. 43 Two of these cases, Lopez and Morrison, merit primary atten-
tion because in these cases the Supreme Court sent a clear message to
Congress that drafting a jurisdictional element into statutes would
support the facial constitutionality of the statutes. Lower courts have
interpreted Lopez and Morrison in two ways. Some view the cases as
guaranteeing that a jurisdictional element will save a statute from fa-
cial attacks, 4 4 while others find the cases merely lend support to the
facial constitutionality of a statute.4 5 This subpart will first examine
the doctrine set forth in Lopez and Morrison, and then it will explore
the degree to which a jurisdictional element has "saving power"
against facial attacks on federal statutes.
1. Lopez
While Lopez is probably most well known for its striking return to
federalism after the Court's sixty-year streak of rejecting Commerce
Clause challenges, 46 it also contributed to Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence by introducing the jurisdictional element to case law.47 In Lo-
39 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
40 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241, 2251, 2252, 2252A (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
41 See infra Part I.C.
42 See infra Part I.D.
43 See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003);Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
44 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
45 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
46 See supra notes 4, 17 and accompanying text.
47 Shargel, supra note 17, at 1859 ("Prior to Lopez, the concept of ajurisdictional
element did not present itself in Commerce Clause case law."). Pre-Lopez cases cer-
tainly examined the constitutionality of statutes containing jurisdictional elements
2oo6] 210 7
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pez, the Court found facially unconstitutional § 9 22(q) of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which prohibits the posses-
sion of a firearm in school zones.48 The Court identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce
Clause power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 49 Finding that the GFSZA fell within the
third category,50 the Court upheld the facial challenge, 51 voicing two
primary concerns relevant to this Note. First, § 9 22(q) bore no rela-
tion to commerce or economic activity.52 The Court wrote that the
statute "is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic ac-
tivity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated."53 Second, § 9 22(q) lacked a juris-
dictional element that would "ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce."54
The Court contrasted § 922(q) with the statute at issue in United States
v. Bass,55 which made it a crime for a felon to "'receive[ ], possess[ ],
or transport[ ] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm."' 56
The Bass Court set aside a conviction under the statute because the
nexus to interstate commerce was not met.57 Under the reasoning of
the Lopez majority, both a large regulatory scheme and the function of
a jurisdictional element had the potential to tip the scale toward facial
constitutionality.5
8
and even suggested that the presence of ajurisdictional element supported the consti-
tutionality of a statute, but they did not label the jurisdictional element as a significant
factor to be considered in a typical Commerce Clause challenge. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (stating that the statute at issue,
which regulates unfair labor practices "affecting commerce," demonstrates that the
statute "purports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct that com-
merce and, thus qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the exercise of con-
trol within constitutional bounds").
48 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1993)).
49 Id. at 558-59.
50 Id. at 559.
51 Id. at 567-68.
52 Id. at 561.
53 Id., quoted in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005).
54 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
55 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
56 Id. at 337 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1982) (re-
pealed 1986)).
57 Id. at 347.
58 The Court noted that congressional findings and a nonattenuated connection
to interstate commerce may also support a statute's constitutionality. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 562-63, 567. However, § 9 22(q) had neither of these attributes.
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Less than eighteen months after Lopez, Congress amended
§ 922(q) to better conform to the Lopez opinion. In addition to in-
serting a variety of legislative findings regarding the effect of guns in
school zones on interstate commerce, 59 Congress inserted a jurisdic-
tional hook: "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to pos-
sess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause
to believe, is a school zone.
60
The amended version has been held constitutional based on the
presence of its jurisdictional element,61 illustrating the saving power
of the jurisdictional element introduced in Lopez.
2. Morrison
Years later, the absence of a jurisdictional element also played a
key role in Morrison. The Morrison Court summarized Lopez to set
forth four factors that would support the facial constitutionality of a
statute 62: (1) the economic nature of the regulated activity; (2) the
presence of a jurisdictional element; (3) the presence of legislative
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce; and (4) the
link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce is not attenuated. 63 The majority found that sec-
tion 13,981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),
64
which provided a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-moti-
vated violence, failed on each factor.65 Commenting on the statute's
lack of a jurisdictional element, the majority wrote: "Although Lopez
makes clear that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to
59 Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 57, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (1) (2000)).
60 Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A)) (emphasis added).
61 See United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating the
amendment adding a jurisdictional element to the statute "resolves the shortcomings
that the Lopez Court found in the prior version of this statute"); United States v.
Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant's challenge to
the constitutionality of the amended version of § 922(q) (2) (A) based on the presence
of the jurisdictional element).
62 These factors have been referred to as the Lopez/Morrison factors. See, e.g., Rob-
ert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power To Prohibit Partial-Birth
Abortion?, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 319, 336 (2005) (referring to a "Lopez/Morrison
factor").
63 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000).
64 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40,302, 108 Stat. 1941, 1941-42 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2000)), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
65 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-19.
2006] 210 9
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the argument that section 13,981 is sufficiently tied to interstate com-
merce, Congress elected to cast section 13,981's remedy over a wider,
and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime. '66 Just as the Lopez
majority contrasted the GFSZA with the statute in Bass that contained
a jurisdictional element, so the Morrison majority contrasted VAWA
section 13,981 with a different statutory provision of VAWA that con-
tained ajurisdictional element. Section 40,221 (a) of VAWA made it a
crime for a person who "travels across a state line ... with the intent to
injure, harass or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner"
to commit an intentional act of domestic violence "in the course of or
as a result of such travel. '67 The Court noted that section 40,221 (a)
had been "uniformly upheld" as an appropriate exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power under the first Lopez category, i.e., activity in
channels of interstate commerce. 68 Morrison reaffirms the distinction
made in Lopez between statutes containing and lacking ajurisdictional
element, demonstrating the support that such an element lends to the
facial constitutionality of a statute.
69
3. The Hook's Saving Power Cannot Save a Statute on Its Own
Since Lopez and Morrison, the Court has made it clear that the
absence of a jurisdictional element does not signify automatic facial un-
constitutionality. 70 The extent to which the presence of a jurisdictional
hook may save a statute, however, has been interpreted in two mutu-
ally exclusive ways by courts and commentators: some view ajurisdic-
tional element as the ultimate saving grace of a statute, 71 while others
66 Id. at 613.
67 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1) (2000) (emphasis added).
68 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 n.5.
69 Although legislation has attempted to enact versions of the statute that include
jurisdictional elements, none have been enacted. See Julie Goldscheid, The Civil
Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 39
FAM. L.Q. 157, 166 n.48 (2005).
70 Sabri v. United States, 514 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) ("We simply do not presume
the unconstitutionality of federal criminal statutes lacking explicit provision of ajuris-
dictional hook .... ."); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 168 (15th ed. 2004).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, No. IP 01-0081-CF-01 T/F, 2001 WL 1708830,
at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 2001) ("After Lopez, courts have 'repeatedly found the inclu-
sion of that jurisdictional element in other provisions of the Gun Control Act suffi-
cient to overcome Commerce Clause challenges."' (quoting Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1999))), aff'd, 361 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.
2004); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Reg-
ulation, 90 IOwA L. REv. 377, 472 (2005) ("Adding ajurisdictional element to even the
most ambitious federal environmental statutes would preserve their constitutionality,
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opine that ajurisdictional element alone cannot ensure the facial con-
stitutionality of a statute. 72 The better view is the latter; while Lopez
and Morrison state that the presence of a jurisdictional hook lends sup-
port to the facial constitutionality of a statute, it does not guarantee
the constitutionality of the statute.
The latter view finds support in Morrison and many circuit deci-
sions. The majority in Mornison states a jurisdictional element "may
establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation
of interstate commerce. ' 73 When determining whether the statute is
in pursuance of the regulation of interstate commerce, courts may
subject the language and limiting force of a jurisdictional element to
close scrutiny. Most circuits have held that "the mere presence of a
jurisdictional hook [does] not automatically render a statute constitu-
tional unless it actually limit[s] the statute's reach. '74 To hold other-
wise would allow Congress to regulate any activity beyond its reach
simply by inserting a hook into every statute as a formality, thereby
negating the purpose of the hook as a guarantee of constitutional ap-
plication. 75 As this Note will discuss in Part I.D, some jurisdictional
elements establish such a weak nexus to interstate commerce that they
have been found insufficient to guarantee the constitutional applica-
tion of a statute.
A jurisdictional element does indeed have saving power, as set
forth in Lopez and Morrison, but this saving power is not complete in
albeit at the expense of each statute's comprehensiveness."); Derek L. Gaubatz,
RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA's Prisoner Provi-
sions, 28 HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 501, 599 (2005) (noting that "[w]here a statute
contains such ajurisdictional element, courts are quick to hold that the statute with-
stands constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce Clause" and stating that "the pres-
ence of a valid jurisdictional element dooms any challenge to [RLUIPA's]
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause").
72 United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 600 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that a "jurisdic-
tional element is not alone sufficient to render [a challenged statute] constitutional'"
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir.
2000))); Stewart, supra note 33, at 209 ("[T]he jurisdictional element does not insu-
late the statute from judicial review, nor guarantee that the courts will find it
constitutional.").
73 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added); see also Ho, 311 F.3d at 600 (em-
phasizing that Morrison does not guarantee that a jurisdictional element will ensure
the constitutionality of a statute).
74 Fischer, supra note 1, at 119. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have followed this view. Id. at 118.
75 United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004) ("The fact is
obvious to the point of tautology: if a statute's jurisdictional element is not sufficiently
restrictive to cabin the statute's reach to permissible applications, then the element is
no guarantee of constitutional application."), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005).
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and of itself. Jurisdictional elements must be in pursuit of Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce and must actually place limits
on statutes' reach. Lopez and Morrison therefore encourage Congress
to legislate using jurisdictional hooks, but they do not guarantee that
the mere insertion of ajurisdictional hook will render a statute facially
constitutional.
C. Jurisprudential Dangers, Aggregation, and As-Applied Challenges
When analyzing as-applied Commerce Clause challenges, courts
have found themselves "caught between two jurisprudential dangers
that the Court's recent precedent directs them to avoid." 76 The first
danger is violating the "non-infinity principle," which holds that
courts must guard federalism and state sovereignty by respecting the
outer limits of Congress's Commerce Clause power and preventing
the federal government from regulating all activity. 77 The opposite
danger is adopting such a constrained interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause power that courts violate the well established "aggrega-
tion principle,"78 which allows courts to reject as-applied challenges
when an intrastate activity "forms part of a general practice that has a
substantial effect on commerce. ' 79 In their most extreme forms, the
two principles represent courts' choice between aggregating nothing
and aggregating everything. Prior to Raich, the Supreme Court had
not provided guidance as to which principle courts should steer
toward.8
0
76 Fischer, supra note 1, at 101.
77 Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995) ("But even
these modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.").
78 Fischer, supra note 1, at 101. The Necessary and Proper Clause, which under-
lies the "substantial effects test... requires a showing that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce when aggregated with similar activities." John Copeland Nagle,
The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Rower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 202
(1998).
79 Fischer, supra note 1, at 101. The Supreme Court articulated the aggregation
principle in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), a case that has been "often
thought to demonstrate the outer limits of the 'affecting commerce' rationale." SUL-
LIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 147. The Wickard Court held a farmer's local
production of wheat largely for home consumption may be constitutionally regulated
by the federal government because "his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, (has an impact on interstate commerce that is] far
from trivial." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
80 Fischer, supra note 1, at 102. Professor Fischer hoped that Raich would settle
this issue. Id.
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Neither principle can be ignored. Violations of the non-infinity
principle pose a grave threat to the viability of as-applied challenges
under the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether a statute contains
a jurisdictional element. Even before Raich, aggressive aggregation
techniques caused some commentators to question whether as-ap-
plied challenges to all statutes were "doom[ed]" because nearly any
scheme could be found to affect interstate commerce. 81 At the same
time, the aggregation principle requires some degree of flexibility in
finding a relationship to interstate commerce-at least for statutes
without narrow jurisdictional elements. One view is that "[t]he cor-
rect answer lies somewhere in the middle, between aggregating every-
thing and aggregating nothing, with Congress given deference to
choose what activities to combine-provided it explains why."8 2 This
view recognizes the importance of striking a balance while giving due
regard to the language and intent of Congress.
If courts give Congress deference regarding the activities it
chooses to combine, they must respect the explicit statutory language
Congress has inserted in the form of jurisdictional elements. By re-
quiring a showing of a relationship to interstate commerce in every
individual case, jurisdictional elements steer courts toward narrower
81 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 78, at 201 ("Courts often say that they are consider-
ing the constitutionality of a particular application of a statute under the Commerce
Clause ... but the fact that trivial instances and de minimis application are nonethe-
less within the scope of congressional power invariably dooms such challenges.").
Professor Nagle attributes the lack of successful as-applied Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to the "de minimis" idea first expressed in United States v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968), that "'where a general regulatory scheme bears a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence.' Nagle, supra note 78, at 200-01 (quoting Wirtz, 392
U.S. at 196 n.27). Wirtz has been widely cited for this proposition. See, e.g., Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558 (quoting this language from Wirtz); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195, 2206 (2005). The broadest reading of Wirtz is that the de minimis idea only
requires that the scheme itself bear a substantial relation to interstate commerce, re-
gardless of the individual or aggregated impact of the specific activity in the case.
This broad view renders as-applied challenges to a statutory scheme essentially moot.
Nagle, supra note 78, at 203. As explained in Part II.B, this is the view the majority
takes in Raich. A narrower reading posits that if the particular activity at issue, when
aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, an individual instance of
that activity may be regulated. See id. at 202-04. Under the narrower view, the court
must decide how the class of activities is defined, i.e., what activity will be aggregated.
In the case of medicinal use of home-grown marijuana, for instance, the courts could
look to a class of activities as broad as the impact of controlled substances generally or
as narrow as the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes when prescribed by a physi-
cian pursuant to state law.
82 Nagle, supra note 78, at 204.
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aggregation.8 3 To the extent that overaggregation places as-applied
challenges in jeopardy,8 4 the jurisdictional hook serves as a safeguard
of as-applied challenges and the non-infinity principle. 85 The Court
reflected a belief in as-applied challenges for statutes containing a ju-
risdictional element when it complained of the absence of such ele-
ments in Lopez and Morrison.
86
On the spectrum of aggregation between aggregating everything
and nothing, jurisdictional elements direct courts closer to the "noth-
ing" end. However, due to the variety of jurisdictional elements that
Congress employs,8 7 courts may implement varying degrees of aggre-
gation within that narrow range to effectuate Congress's language and
intent. The language of a particular jurisdictional element provides
courts with some guidance as to the degree of aggregation that should
be employed. While narrow hooks generally require a closer nexus to
interstate commerce and thereby tend to respect the non-infinity prin-
ciple, broader versions lend themselves to more aggressive aggrega-
tion. As illustrated by two Supreme Court cases, the language of each
statute's jurisdictional element largely determines the balance courts
strike between the non-infinity principle and the aggregation princi-
ple when applying a given statute.
In the unanimous decision of Jones v. United States,88 the Supreme
Court interpreted the narrow jurisdictional element in 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i) to respect the non-infinity principle while allowing some de-
gree of aggregation.8 9 The jurisdictional element requires courts to
83 See id. (noting that the narrowest view of aggregation would require a showing
of a relationship to interstate commerce in every individual case, which would be "the
equivalent of requiring each federal statute to contain a jurisdictional element").
84 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85 See Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez
and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1675, 1720 (2002) ("If a statute does contain a jurisdictional element asserting Con-
gress's authority, then the statute is presumed to be facially valid, and a reviewing
court must determine whether the statute is valid 'as applied' to each particular
case.").
86 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, 2005
CATO SuP. CT. REv. 71, 88 (stating the Court "obviously anticipated doing as-applied
analyses when it complained in both Lopez and Morrison about the absence ofjurisdic-
tional elements that would make as-applied case-by-case examination possible").
87 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
88 529 U.S. 848 (2000). The statute at issue in this case criminalizes the malicious
damage or destruction, or attempt to damage or destruct, "by means of fire or an
explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate
or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
89 Jones, 529 U.S. at 859.
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inquire whether property damaged by fire or explosives is property
"used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce."90 While the Court noted that "af-
fecting.., commerce," when unqualified, signals Congress's intent to
invoke its full Commerce Clause authority, the jurisdictional element
in § 844(i) requires a closer analysis into whether the damaged prop-
erty was "used" in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce.
"The proper inquiry... 'is into the function of the building itself, and
then a determination of whether that function affects commerce."9I
The Court rejected the government's attempts to satisfy the "use[ ] in
interstate . . . commerce" requirement with activities that were not
central to the purpose of the home but that affected commerce in
some way, such as "using" a residence to receive natural gas from out-
of-state sources. 92 If such a connection sufficed to trigger § 844(i),
the language in the jurisdictional element would have no meaning
because "hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal
statute's domain."93 Aided by the narrow language of § 844(i)'sjuris-
dictional element, the Court construed the statute in a way that re-
spects the non-infinity principle and avoids constitutional doubts.
94
90 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
91 Jones, 529 U.S. at 854 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir.
1993) (Arnold, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
92 Prior to Jones, several circuits had found that a passive connection between a
building and interstate commerce met the jurisdictional element of § 844(i). United
States v. Tush, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1248-49 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing as examples cases
finding a nexus between interstate commerce and local churches and restaurants that
used out-of-state natural gas and food supplies).
93 Jones, 529 U.S. at 857. The Court approved of its previous holding that a build-
ing "'used as rental property'" satisfies the jurisdictional element. Id. at 853 (quoting
Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 858 (1985)).
94 See Jones, 529 U.S. at 857 ("Our reading of § 844(i) is in harmony with the
guiding principle that 'where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of
which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.'" (quoting United States ex
rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 409 (1909)). For more on the
principle of interpreting statutes so as to avoid constitutional doubts, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of
Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) ("Another frequently cited prescription
of constitutional avoidance calls for courts to prefer statutory interpretations that do
not generate constitutional difficulties: '[W]here an otherwise acceptable construc-
tion of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988))). See also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3.5, at 264-65
(3d ed. 2006) (describing recent Supreme Court rulings that have incorporated a
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As noted by the Jones Court, statutes containing less restrictive ju-
risdictional elements than the one in § 844(i)-i.e., those that do not
contain "qualifying" language-require a less stringent nexus to inter-
state commerce and are therefore more susceptible to aggregation.
For example, the Federal Arbitration Act enforces arbitration provi-
sions in all "contracts evidencing a transaction involving commerce. '95
The Court has held the words "involving commerce" are the func-
tional equivalent of "affecting commerce," thereby indicating a con-
gressional intent to legislate to the limits of Commerce Clause
authority.96 To satisfy the FAA's jurisdictional element, courts have
looked to a variety of factors, such as whether (1) the general practice
of the transaction affects commerce;9 7 (2) the negotiations require an
individual to move to another state to fulfill the contract;98 (3) the
contracting parties receive or use goods from out-of-state vendors in
fulfilling the terms of the contract;99 (4) out-of-state payment is ac-
cepted, e.g., from insurance carriers;100 and (5) the activity is regu-
lated by federal administrative bodies. 10 1 The lenience of these
factors suggests that very few contracts will fall outside the FAA. 10 2
This result is generally consistent with the meaning of the language
"affecting commerce," which reaches to the outer limits of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority. In order to give meaning to the jurisdic-
principle of avoiding constitutional doubts). But see William K. Kelley, Avoiding Con-
stitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 898 (2001) (ar-
guing against application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance).
95 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
96 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
97 See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 58 (2003); Serv. Corp. Int'l v.
Fulmer, 883 So. 2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003); Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129,
1134-35 (Ala. 2003).
98 See Whitley v. Carolina Neurosurgical Assocs., No. 1:01CV00105, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27686, at *6-7 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2002); Thornton v. Trident Med. Ctr.,
L.L.C., 592 S.E.2d 50, 54 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
99 Maddox v. USA Healthcare-Adams, L.L.C., 350 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (M.D. Ala.
2004); Whitley, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27686, at *6; Potts v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc.,
853 So. 2d 194, 203 (Ala. 2002).
100 See Whitley, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27686, at *6.
101 See Serv. Corp. Int'l, 883 So. 2d at 630.
102 See id. at 629 ("Given this background, and in light of the continued vitality of
Wickard ... it would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or com-
mercial activity that one could, with any confidence, declare beyond the reach of Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause and, by extension, under the FAA. While
there can be no per se rule that would preclude a trial court's role in evaluating
whether a contract 'evidences a transaction involving commerce,' . . . a trial court
evaluating a contract connected to some economic or commercial activity would
rarely, if ever, refuse to compel arbitration on the ground that the transactions lacked
'involvement' in interstate commerce." (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000))).
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tional element, courts have interpreted it more broadly in accordance
with the broader statutory language. Although this approach may en-
croach upon the non-infinity principle, it nonetheless indicates that
jurisdictional elements should be given the meaning that Congress in-
tended them to carry.
In steering between the two "dangers" of violating the non-infin-
ity principle or the aggregation principle, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that courts should examine carefully the language of
jurisdictional elements on a statute-by-statute basis in order to give the
elements their intended meaning.
D. The Question of Sufficiency
Another type of jurisdictional element not explored in Part I.C
forces courts to come dangerously close to violating the non-infinity
principle without even utilizing aggregation techniques. For example,
statutory language may permit regulation of any activity that crosses a
state line or that involves materials that have traveled in interstate
commerce, even if the activity has no substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 0 3 Because these "line-crossing" hooks expand, rather
than limit, Congress's Commerce Clause authority, they have been the
subject of significant criticism. 1° 4 Perhaps the most hotly contested
line-crossing hook is the materials-in-commerce prong 10 5 in provisions
of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 prohibiting the pos-
session and production of child pornography created using materials
that have traveled in interstate commerce. 10 6 Commentators and
courts have suggested that a number of other jurisdictional elements
should fall within the same category.
10 7
As discussed previously, a jurisdictional element must "actually
limit[ ] the statute's reach" for it to support the constitutionality of a
103 See supra note 23.
104 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 1, at 120 (stating that these jurisdictional hooks
violate the non-infinity principle); McGimsey, supra note 85, at 1720 (noting that
"when courts allow any line crossing.., to satisfy the jurisdictional element and thus
ensure a sufficient connection to interstate commerce, the statutes undergo no addi-
tional Commerce Clause analysis. In sum, constitutionality is essentially assumed both
facially and as applied"); id. at 1710-19 (questioning the sufficiency of line-crossing
hooks in a variety of statutes).
105 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 101.
106 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251 (a), 2252(a), 2252A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
107 See McGimsey, supra note 85, at 1710-19.
2oo6] 211 7
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
statute.'08 A constitutionally sufficient jurisdictional element-that is,
a jurisdictional element that creates a nexus to interstate commerce
that is sufficient to ensure that a statute is constitutional as applied to
a given set of facts' 09-is defined as one that "either limits the regula-
tion to interstate activity or ensures that the intrastate activity to be
regulated falls within one of the three categories of congressional
power." 110 If a court determines a jurisdictional element does not
meet these criteria, it may deem the jurisdictional element constitu-
tionally insufficient.
The question of constitutional sufficiency is best illustrated by the
child pornography statutes. The courts of appeals are split as to the
sufficiency of the materials-in-commerce prong in the child pornogra-
phy statutes, with the majority of the circuits holding that it is insuffi-
cient to ensure the constitutional application of the statutes to
defendants' local behavior. 1 ' Courts have recognized that some judi-
cial restraint must be exercised if jurisdictional elements are to carry
any meaning and fulfill their aim of "limit [ing] the reach of a particu-
lar statute to a discrete set of cases that substantially affect interstate
commerce."11 2 As a result, these courts have often looked beyond the
jurisdictional element to determine whether the regulated activity has
an otherwise-substantial effect on interstate commerce." 83 If no such
relationship exists, courts refuse to apply the statutes to the situation.
For example, before the Supreme Court handed down a decision in
Raich, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Maxwell' 14 had reversed
the defendant's conviction for possession of child pornography
108 Fischer, supra note 1, at 118; supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. This
limiting function was contemplated by the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 104-07.
110 United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999).
111 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 118-19.
112 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114,1125 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Rodia, 194
F.3d at 473 (finding the materials-in-commerce prong did not "adequately perform [ ]
the function of guaranteeing that the final product regulated substantially affects in-
terstate commerce," but ultimately upholding the defendant's conviction because the
defendant's conduct had a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
113 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 110-18. Varying degrees of aggregation are uti-
lized to determine whether this relationship exists, which may determine whether as-
applied challenges are upheld or rejected. Compare United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d
325, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to find a relationship to interstate commerce based
on the aggregate effects of intrastate child pornography and reversing defendant's
conviction), with Rodia, 194 F.3d at 468 (upholding defendant's conviction and find-
ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce because the intrastate production of
child pornography has an effect on the interstate market for child pornography).
114 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005).
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images on two computer disks that had traveled in interstate com-
merce after their manufacture but before the illegal images were
saved to the disks. 1 5 The court had found that the materials-in-com-
merce prong was "patently insufficient to ensure the statute's constitu-
tional application" and additionally concluded that the "substantial
effects" test was not met.' 16
Maxwell's subsequent history indicates that after Raich, the consti-
tutional insufficiency of jurisdictional elements may no longer be a
problem. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Maxwell for re-
view in light of Raich, 1 7 and the Eleventh Circuit reversed its prior
decision, essentially ruling that when an activity falls within Congress's
broad power as described in Raich, a statute's jurisdictional element
and any debates as to its sufficiency may be ignored.1 18 In the court's
view, sufficiency is only relevant when "a jurisdictional element is re-
quired," i.e., when the Raich principle does not apply. 119
Although the Eleventh Circuit applied Raich to disregard the suf-
ficiency of the materials-in-commerce prong, questions remain as to
whether this is an appropriate application of Raich. When courts de-
termine what meaning to give jurisdictional elements in the post-Raich
era, it will be important for them to consider questions of sufficiency,
the language and purpose of the jurisdictional element, and the bal-
ance between the non-infinity principle and the aggregation princi-
ple. The next Part will discuss the Raich decision, and Part III will
explore the role these factors play in a post-Raich analysis of the juris-
dictional element.
II. THE RAIcHERA
A few home-grown marijuana plants prompting the Raich litiga-
tion have germinated into the beginning of a new Commerce Clause
era following the "new federalism" counterrevolution of Lopez and
Morrison.120 Raich reaffirms the effectiveness and efficiency of Con-
gress's use of a regulatory net as a tool for legislating broadly to catch
interstate and intrastate activities alike. The jurisdictional hook finds
itself in a precarious position after Raich, struggling to require a nexus
to interstate commerce despite the Raich net's threat to dispense with
case-by-case inquiry and nullify the very purpose of the hook. This
115 Id. at 1055.
116 Id. at 1063.
117 Maxwell, 126 S. Ct. 321.
118 Maxwell, 446 F.3d at 1218-19.
119 Id. at 1218.
120 See supra notes 4, 17 and accompanying text.
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Part will first explore the Raich decision and then discuss the various
ways in which courts may interpret and narrow the decision in future
cases.
A. The Raich Decision
Raich concerns the application of the Controlled Substances Act
to Angel McLary Raich and Diane Monson, two California citizens us-
ing home-cultivated marijuana as medical treatment for serious ill-
nesses.121 The CSA prohibits the manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana and recognizes no legitimate use for the sub-
stance.' 22 After federal agents seized Monson's marijuana in 2002,
she and Raich filed suit in the Northern District of California against
the United States Attorney General and the head of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to pre-
vent government enforcement of the CSA against their medicinal use
of marijuana.1
23
In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the regulation of the intrastate, noncommercial use of
medical marijuana is outside the scope of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, and therefore the CSA was unconstitutional as applied
to them. 124 The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion based on
Ninth Circuit precedent upholding the application of the CSA to the
wholly intrastate cultivation of marijuana. 125 A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, distinguishing the
Ninth Circuit cases by narrowing the definition of the class of activities
at issue 126 and finding that said class of activities failed all four prongs
121 Raich v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2199-200 (2005).
122 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2000); see also supra note 14 (describing the CSA).
123 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
124 Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 352 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Raich v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2195.
125 Id. at 920, 925.
126 The Ninth Circuit demonstrated the significance of how the class of activities is
defined for purposes of aggregation. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228 ("[W]hereas the earlier
cases concerned drug trafficking, the appellants' conduct constitutes a separate and
distinct class of activities: the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of
cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient's physician pur-
suant to valid California state law. Clearly, the way in which the activity or class of
activities is defined is critical."). For more on the difficult question of which class of
activities to regulate, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Proce-
dures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 965 (2001) ("The Supreme Court has never addressed the
level of specificity that Congress must use under the Commerce Clause when aggre-
gating activities affecting interstate commerce.") and discussion supra note 81.
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of the Lopez/Morrison "substantial effects" test.127 First, the CSA does
not regulate commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, and there-
fore the aggregation analysis in Wickard is not available. 128 Second,
and most pertinent to this Note, the relevant provisions of the CSA do
not contain a jurisdictional element that would limit its application.
1 29
Third, although the CSA includes certain congressional findings re-
garding the effects of intrastate activity on interstate commerce, the
findings "do not specifically address the class of activities at issue
here."' 1 3 0 Finally, the court found only an attenuated connection be-
tween the regulated activity and an effect on interstate commerce.
13 1
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in
a 6-3 decision written by Justice Stevens, finding the CSA constitu-
tional as applied to the facts of the case. 132 The Court turned to Wick-
ard to illustrate the principle that Congress may regulate "purely local
activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce."1 3 3 The Court found "strik-
ing" similarities between this case and Wickard, including the nature
of the goods being regulated, the activity involved, and the purpose of
the statutes in question. 3 4 Accepting the Ninth Circuit's characteriza-
tion of the narrow "class of activities" at issue in the case, the Court
found that Congress acted rationally in including these activities as an
essential part of the larger regulatory scheme: "One need not have a
degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for
the vast quantity of marijuana . . . locally cultivated for personal
use ... may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this
extraordinarily popular substance."' 3 5 Ultimately, the Court con-
127 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234.
128 Id. at 1229-31.
129 Id. at 1231.
130 Id. at 1231-33.
131 Id. at 1233-34.
132 Raich v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005).
133 Id. at 2205.
134 Id. at 2206-07.
135 Id. at 2211. The majority referred and deferred to Congress's "rational basis"
no less than six times in the opinion. Id. at 2206 ("When Congress decides that the
'total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to the national market, it may regulate
the entire class." (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927))); id. at
2207 ("In Wickard, we had no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational ba-
sis .... "); id. at 2208 ("We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a
'rational basis' exists for so concluding."); id. ("[W]e have no difficulty concluding
that Congress had a rational basis ... ."); id. at 2212 ("The congressional judgment
that an exemption for such a significant segment of the total market would under-
mine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong
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cluded that in both Wickard and the instant case, Congress had a ra-
tional basis for believing that in the aggregate, exempting the home-
consumed plant from the regulatory scheme "would have a substantial
influence on price and market conditions."
13 6
Criticizing the respondents' "myopic focus," the Court stated that
the respondents' reliance on Lopez and Morrison overlooks "the larger
context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by
those cases. Moreover, even in the narrow prism of respondents' crea-
tion, they read those cases far too broadly."137 The Court distin-
guished Lopez and Morrison in three ways. First, the respondents in
this case raise an as-applied challenge to the CSA, whereas both Lopez
and Morrison involved a "markedly different" facial challenge. 138 The
Court noted that the "distinction [between as-applied and facial chal-
lenges] is pivotal for we have often reiterated that '[w] here the class of
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal
power, the courts have no power "to excise, as trivial, individual in-
stances" of the class.'" 139 Second, the Court found that the CSA is "at
the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum" in relation to the GFSZA
at issue in Lopez. 140 The CSA, enacted as part of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,141 is a "lengthy and
detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework," whereas the
GFSZA was merely a "discrete prohibition."142 Borrowing language
from Lopez, the Court found that the CSA was "merely one of many
'essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated."' 43 Third, the CSA regulates "quintessentially eco-
nomic" activity because it "regulates the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market."'144 Furthermore, specifically prohibiting
the intrastate possession or manufacturing of an "article of com-
presumption of validity."); id. at 2215 ("Congress could have rationally concluded
that the aggregate impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted
from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial.").
136 Id. at 2207.
137 Id. at 2209.
138 Id.
139 Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
140 Id. at 2210.
141 Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242-48 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C.A. § 801-971 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005)).
142 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210.
143 Id. at 2210 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561 (1995)).
144 Id. at 2211.
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merce" (in this case, marijuana) "is a rational.., means of regulating
commerce in that product."
1 45
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia supported the idea that local
activities may be regulated as part of a larger regulatory scheme of
commerce. 146 Under Justice Scalia's view, Congress may regulate an
intrastate activity under a comprehensive scheme even though the ac-
tivity does not itself "substantially affect" interstate commerce and
even if it is noneconomic, so long as the activity is a necessary part of
that scheme. 147 Invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause and con-
ducting a means-end analysis, Justice Scalia concluded that Congress
could reasonably find that regulation of the class of activities is a nec-
essary and proper means to effectuate the congressional objective of
prohibiting marijuana from the interstate market.
148
In a heated dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that the Court's rule "gives
Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the
Commerce Clause"' 49 and "is tantamount to removing meaningful
limits on the Commerce Clause. ' 150 Justice Thomas, in a separate dis-
sent, argued that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and
Proper Clause justifies the regulation of interstate and intrastate activ-
ity alike merely because "Congress casts its net broadly over an inter-
state market"'51 and further urged that as-applied challenges should
remain viable. 152 Demonstrating the danger of encroaching on the
non-infinity principle, he wrote that "[i]f the majority is to be taken
seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees,
clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States" simply
by casting a broad net.
153
B. Interpreting Raich: Handing Congress the Regulatory Net
In distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, the Raich majority made
clear that those cases should not be read "too broadly" and must be
considered in "the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause
jurisprudence preserved by those cases."1 54 In the wake of the "new
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 2220.
149 Id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 2222.
151 Id. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 2238.
153 Id. at 2236.
154 Id. at 2209 (majority opinion).
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federalism" approach stirred up by Lopez and Morrison,155 Raich in-
forms us that Lopez and Morrison are not the last word on Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, nor do those opinions govern all Commerce
Clause challenges to all statutes. 156 To determine what meaning Raich
will take on in future Commerce Clause challenges involving statutes
with jurisdictional hooks, it is first necessary to clarify the principles
for which Raich stands and the effect it may have on Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
It is difficult to determine how courts will apply Raich and to what
extent the Supreme Court may narrow its holding. Just as the Raich
Court narrowed Lopez and Morrison and confined their holdings to
facial challenges, so also may courts narrow the Raich principle to cer-
tain facts of the case. 157 The main thrust of Raich, to which this Note
has referred as the Raich principle, states that "regulation of noncom-
mercial, intrastate activity is constitutionally permissible under the
Commerce Clause if the regulation is an 'essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.' 1 58 The
Court emphasized a high level of deference to Congress, stating that
Congress need only have a rational basis for determining that failure
to regulate the local activity would "'undercut"' the comprehensive
regulatory scheme.
159
155 See supra notes 4, 17 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 13, at 497 ("More generally, Raich sig-
nals that the Rehnquist Court's so-called federalism 'revolution,' if it ever existed, is
hardly as radical as some feared. The ripple effects of the Raich decision are just
starting to be felt in the lower courts, but early analysis suggests that, at the end of the
day, the history books may view Lopez and Morrison more as aberrations in the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence rather than as the genesis of a seismic constitutional
revolution." (footnotes omitted)); Craig M. Bradley, Wat Ever Happened to Federalism?,
TRIAL, Aug. 2005, at 52, 52 (stating that in Raich "the Court strangled in its infancy the
so-called federalism revolution that began a mere 10 years ago with the United States v.
Lopez decision and which was reinforced five years later in United States v. Morrison"
(citations omitted)); Paul J. Watford, State Lines: Redefining the Reach of the Commerce
Clause May Be One of the Important Legacies of the Rehnquist Court, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2005,
at 24, 28 ("In the wake of Raich... whatever momentum Lopez and Morrison gener-
ated for curtailing the commerce clause powers of Congress seems to have been
halted.").
157 See supra text accompanying notes 138-45.
158 Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 13, at 492 (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209).
159 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995)); see supra note 135.
[VOL. 81: 5212 4
JURISDICTIONAL HOOKS IN THE WAKE OF RAICH
When the Raich principle applies, as-applied challenges will inevi-
tably fail. 160 Therefore, it is important to determine when the Raich
principle applies. The majority writes that the "distinction [between
as-applied and facial challenges] is pivotal for we have often reiterated
that '[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within
the reach of federal power, the courts have no power "to excise, as
trivial, individual instances" of the class.' "1 61 To the extent that Raich
precludes as-applied challenges, debates about the degree of aggrega-
tion are no longer relevant. 162 Justice Thomas disagrees with this re-
sult in his dissent, arguing that as-applied challenges should be
permitted in order to curb Congress's "overreaching on a case-by-case
basis."'163 The case-by-case inquiry Justice Thomas seeks to preserve is
the exact function of the jurisdictional element;164 applying Raich to
statutes containing jurisdictional elements would negate this function
entirely. It seems an absurd result to permit the Raich principle to
overshadow Congress's intentional drafting of ajurisdictional element
into a statute, but this is the inevitable result if the Raich principle
applies even to statutes containing jurisdictional elements.1 65 By ig-
noring the jurisdictional element in these statutes, courts could allow
federal prosecutions for arson even when a building has no tie to in-
terstate commerce and for child pornography violations even when
the images are created entirely intrastate; in addition, courts could
160 Of the little commentary available thus far regarding the effect of Raich on as-
applied challenges, one letter to the editors of Environmental Law explains the proba-
ble impact of Raich on the Endangered Species Act, which was at issue in Rancho Viejo,
L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the now famous (or infamous) "hap-
less toad" case: "We think the Court's recent embracing of the comprehensive scheme
rationale immunizes the ESA take provision from the sort of as-applied attacks prop-
erty rights activists have previously brought against its application." Blumm & Kim-
brell, supra note 13, at 496.
161 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (second alteration in original) (quoting Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
162 See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 13, at 498 (noting that then Judge Roberts's
dissenting concern over the scope of aggregation in Rancho Viejo is "no longer a live
[issue] in the post-Raich era, as it has been superceded by the Raich Court's resound-
ing affirmation of the comprehensive scheme principle"). The statute of concern in
Rancho Viejo, the Endangered Species Act, does not contain a jurisdictional element.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
163 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("This Court has regularly
entertained as-applied challenges under constitutional provisions, including the Com-
merce Clause. There is no reason why, when Congress exceeds the scope of its com-
merce power, courts may not invalidate Congress' overreaching on a case-by-case
basis." (citations omitted)).
164 See supra Part 1.
165 See infra Part III.A.1-2.
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enforce the Federal Arbitration Act in contractual disputes between
intrastate parties over a transaction involving no significant interstate
activity. The key to assessing the viability of the jurisdictional element,
then, is determining when courts may narrow application of the Raich
principle and whether they may do so in a way that preserves the
meaning of the jurisdictional element.
Under the broadest reading of Raich, the Raich principle applies
when the following requirements are present: (1) the challenge is an
as-applied one; (2) the statutory provision is part of a regulatory
scheme; (3) the regulatory scheme governs economic activity; and (4)
the court finds Congress had a rational basis for regulating local activ-
ity under the regulatory scheme. A more conservative reading, how-
ever, may look to factors that are not themselves elements of the Raich
principle, for example: (5) the intrastate activity at issue involves a
commodity; and (6) the statutory provision does not contain a juris-
dictional element. With respect to the fifth criterion, the Court re-
ferred to the fungible nature of the marijuana when assessing its
economic nature and comparing it to the wheat in Wickard,166 sug-
gesting that perhaps Raich may someday be narrowed to govern only
commodities for which there is an interstate market.
The last factor is the focus of this Note. Although the absence of
a jurisdictional element was never mentioned by the Court, the statu-
tory scheme played a key role in the decision and therefore it is possi-
ble that a jurisdictional element could serve as a distinguishing point
in cases to come. As this Note will discuss in the next Part, some
courts have read Raich broadly and rendered statutes' jurisdictional
elements irrelevant when applying the Raich principle, while others
have continued to give jurisdictional elements significant meaning by
limiting the application of Raich in as-applied challenges involving a
jurisdictional element.
III. THE MEANING OF JURISDICTIONAL HOOKS AFTER RACH
Even if Congress chooses to utilize the Raich net when drafting
statutes from this point forward, it has already cast its power using a
jurisdictional hook in a significant number of statutes.167 Does Raich
permit courts to disregard the case-specific hooks and use the Raich
net to catch intrastate and interstate activity alike, regardless of
166 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206. The fungible nature of regulated activity became an
important factor in United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005), which analo-
gized marijuana and child pornography, both of which are commodities with an inter-
state market. See id. at 78.
167 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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whether the regulated activities would be "keepers" using solely a
hook? Or should the CSA in Raich be distinguished from statutes con-
taining jurisdictional elements, thereby requiring courts to ignore the
Raich principle when a jurisdictional hook is present? Several courts
of appeals have already confronted these questions (explicitly or im-
plicitly) and approached the issue in different ways, and the Supreme
Court has vacated and remanded at least two cases involving as-ap-
plied challenges to jurisdictional elements for review in light of
Raich. 1
68
This Part identifies four possible approaches for dealing with the
question of whether Raich applies to statutes containing jurisdictional
elements. First, courts may apply the Raich principle to statutes con-
taining jurisdictional elements, rendering the elements meaningless
and avoiding any debates as to the sufficiency of the jurisdictional ele-
ment. Second, courts may apply the Raich principle to statutes con-
taining certain types of jurisdictional elements but not others, based
on the Lopez category of Commerce Clause regulation (e.g., channels
of commerce, instrumentalities of commerce, or activities that sub-
stantially affect commerce) or Congress's motivation in inserting the
hook. Third, courts may find that Raich never applies to statutes con-
taining jurisdictional elements. The final approach, and the one this
Note will argue is the most sound, is that courts not apply Raich di-
rectly but offer it to support either a principle of narrow aggregation
or the regulation of intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
Where courts find Raich does not apply, as in the third and
fourth approaches mentioned above, they are faced with a second task
of dealing with jurisdictional elements that may be insufficient. This
Part argues that when assessing the constitutional sufficiency of ajuris-
dictional element, courts should adopt a flexible approach that does
not penalize Congress for drafting a weak jurisdictional element.
A. Four Possibilities for Application and Nonapplication of Raich
1. Raich Always Applies
The broadest view of Raich and Congress's Commerce Clause
power holds that the Raich principle always applies to statutes contain-
ing jurisdictional elements. Under this view, the sufficiency of the ju-
risdictional element is irrelevant because the nexus between
individual instances and interstate commerce is no longer required.
All that is necessary is that an activity be regulated by a federal statu-
168 See infra Part III.A.
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tory provision that is essential to a larger regulatory scheme and that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that failure to regulate
the class of activity at issue would "'undercut"' the larger scheme.1
69
The Eleventh, Tenth, Sixth and Fourth Circuits have recently adopted
this broad view in cases involving the materials-in-commerce prongs of
the child pornography statutes.
After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded an Eleventh Cir-
cuit decision for review in light of Raich, the Eleventh Circuit's appli-
cation of Raich rendered meaningless the jurisdictional element in 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5) (B), which prohibits the possession of child por-
nography that has traveled in interstate commerce or was produced
using materials that have traveled in interstate commerce. 170 As men-
tioned in Part I.D, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Maxwell ap-
plied the Raich principle to uphold Maxwell's conviction for
possession of child pornography on computer disks that had traveled
in interstate commerce prior to their use.171 Blatantly disregarding
the statute's jurisdictional element and its admitted insufficiency, the
court read Raich to permit regulation of all intrastate possession of
child pornography, not just that which fulfilled the materials-in-com-
merce prong.172 The court recognized that "where ajurisdictional el-
ement is required, a meaningful one . . . must be offered," but here
the materials-in-commerce prong was not "required" to regulate Max-
well's activity under the Raich principle. 173 In effect, the court al-
lowed the Raich principle to negate the specific nexus of the
materials-in-commerce prong.
Justifying its decision, the Maxwell court reasoned that Congress
should not be penalized for failing to exercise its authority to regulate
all child pornography. 174 Essentially striking insufficient jurisdictional
elements from a statute, however, hardly seems to be the method of
interpretation that best serves congressional interests. Maxwell allows
courts to disregard the jurisdictional elements of federal statutes regu-
lating intrastate activity that could be swept in under the broad Raich
net; this effectively permits courts to rewrite statutes to extend more
169 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995)).
170 United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2006). A similar
Eleventh Circuit decision, United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), va-
cated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005), was also vacated and remanded for review in light of
Raich. At the time of this printing, the Eleventh Circuit had not reconsidered Smith.
171 Maxwell, 446 F.3d at 1212, 1216-19.
172 Id. at 1218-19.
173 Id. at 1219.
174 Id. at 1218-19.
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broadly than the statutes' plain language indicates-and perhaps
more broadly than Congress intended the statutes to reach.
In United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 175 the Tenth Circuit applied
the Raich principle to hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a), which prohibits
the inducement of minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct for
the production of child pornography using materials that have been
transported in interstate and foreign commerce, was constitutionally
applied to defendant Jeronimo-Bautista's local production of porno-
graphic images of a child. 176 Referring to § 2251 (a) as part of a "com-
prehensive scheme" to eliminate child pornography, 177 the court
applied the Raich principle without hesitation. Because Congress had
a rational basis for determining that regulation of intrastate child por-
nography production is an essential part of the comprehensive
scheme, the court struck down Jeronimo-Bautista's as-applied chal-
lenge. 178 In a footnote, the court noted the presence of a jurisdic-
tional element but quickly dismissed its significance and any questions
as to its sufficiency:
Section 2251 (a) includes a jurisdictional element as required by the
Lopez/Morrison factors. While other courts have questioned the suf-
ficiency of § 2251 (a) 's jurisdictional element, we need not linger on
the issue. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Raich, and our
conclusion that the activity regulated in this case has a substantial
impact on interstate commerce, any "failure of the jurisdictional el-
ement effectively to limit the reach of the statute is not
de terminative." 179
175 425 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1771 (2006).
176 Id. at 1272-73.
177 Id. at 1269.
178 Id. at 1273.
179 Id. at 1273 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d
83, 89 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Court cited with approval Holston, a Second Circuit pre-
Raich decision that "anticipated the analysis subsequently laid out in Raich" and also
dismissed the importance of § 2251 (a)'s jurisdictional element:
[In Holston], the court held that "when Congress regulates a class of activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce, the fact that certain intrastate
activities . . . may not actually have a significant effect on interstate com-
merce is ... irrelevant. Moreover, the nexus to interstate commerce . . . is
determined by the class of activities regulated by the statute as a whole, not
by the simple act for which an individual defendant is convicted. Where, as
here, a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce,
the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is
of no consequence."
Id. at 1273 (omissions in original) (quoting Holston, 343 F.3d at 90-91).
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By applying the Raich principle, the Tenth Circuit avoided the exten-
sive debate regarding the sufficiency of § 2251 (a)'s jurisdictional ele-
ment. 80 The court's reasoning renders the jurisdictional element
irrelevant and makes possible the regulation of all child pornography
production, regardless of its individual nexus to commerce, simply be-
cause the production of child pornography using materials that have
traveled in commerce forms part of a comprehensive scheme to regu-
late child pornography.
The Sixth Circuit has also applied Raich to child pornography
statutes. In United States v. Gann,'18 Gann moved to dismiss charges
under § 2251 (a),182 arguing that although the materials-in-commerce
element was easily met by the facts of the case, more should be re-
quired due to the questionable sufficiency of this jurisdictional ele-
ment. 83 Earlier Sixth Circuit cases had required a separate showing
of a substantial effect on interstate commerce, 184 and Gann argued
that the court should require a similar showing in his case.' 8 5 Placing
heavy reliance on Raich, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled that no such
showing was necessary.' 8 6 As in Raich, the statute was part of a
broader regulatory scheme "'to regulate the interstate market in a
fungible commodity,"' 8 7 and "Congress ha[d] a rational basis for be-
lieving that 'homegrown' child pornography can 'feed[ ] the national
market and stimulate [ ] demand."' 1 88 The Sixth Circuit dismissed the
concern that general regulation of child pornography may sweep in
purely intrastate activity, stating, as in Raich, that this result was of
-'no moment.' "189 The Sixth Circuit has followed Gann in interpret-
ing § 2252A(a) (5) (B).190
180 See supra Part I.D. The Tenth Circuit has recently followed its analysis in Jerw-
nimo-Bautista, reaffirming that it is unnecessary to inquire into the adequacy of the
jurisdictional element in § 2251(a). See United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263,
1272 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Croxford, No. 04-4158, 2006 WL 541250, at
*9-10 (10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2006).
181 160 F. App'x 466 (6th Cir. 2005).
182 Id. at 467.
183 Id. at 470, 472.
184 Id. at 470-71 (citing United States v. Andrews, 383 F.3d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir.
2004) and United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332-33 (6th Cir. 2001)).
185 Id. at 470, 472.
186 Id. at 472-73.
187 Id. at 473 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005)).
188 Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. An-
drews, 383 F.3d 374, 378 n.1 (2004)).
189 Id. (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209).
190 See United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2006).
[VOL. 81:52130
JURISDICTIONAL HOOKS IN THE WAKE OF RAICH
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Forrest,19 1 also rejected as-
applied challenges to local regulation of child pornography activity
and dismissed the materials-in-commerce jurisdictional element in a
footnote. Relying on Raich, the Fourth Circuit upheld Forrest's con-
viction for "wholly intrastate production and possession of child por-
nography" under § 2251 (a) (production) and § 2252A(a) (5) (B)
(possession). 1 92 Comparing Forrest to Raich, the court found Raich
controlled because of three "striking[ ],,193 similarities in both cases:
(1) the regulatory schemes govern "'quintessentially economic"' activ-
ities, 194 i.e., both statutes directly regulate economic activity in a "'fun-
gible commodity' ";195 (2) Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that local regulation of both commodities was essential to
their interstate regulation; and (3) Congress made findings of the lo-
cal activities' effect on the interstate markets, although it is not re-
quired to do so.
19 6
While the Fourth Circuit's Raich analysis is relatively straightfor-
ward, its cursory dismissal of the jurisdictional element is rather puz-
zling given the nature of the CSA and Fourth Circuit precedent. In
the first footnote, the court responded to Forrest's argument that the
materials-in-commerce jurisdictional element is insufficient:
Although a jurisdictional element may establish that a given statute
"is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce,"
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146
L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), an effective jurisdictional element is certainly
not required where, as here, the statute directly regulates economic
activity. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162
L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (upholding Controlled Substances Act under
Commerce Clause without discussion of statute's jurisdictional
element) .197
The Fourth Circuit attempted to cite Raich for the proposition that
although the CSA had a jurisdictional element, the Supreme Court
ignored that element when setting forth the Raich principle. The ob-
vious problem with this argument is that the relevant statutory provi-
sions at issue in Raich do not contain ajurisdictional element, as noted
by the Ninth Circuit when applying the four-pronged Lopez/Morrison
191 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005).
192 Id. at 78.
193 Id.
194 Id. (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211).
195 Id. (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 77 n.1.
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test.198 The Court's statement that an effective jurisdictional element
is not required here is also puzzling because of its prior decisions rec-
ognizing the viability of the materials-in-commerce prongs.1 99 Regard-
less of the Court's precedent or reasoning, Forrest stands for the
principle that Raich fully applies to statutes regulating economic activ-
ity, even if those statutes contain jurisdictional elements. Because "an
effective jurisdictional element is certainly not required,"' 200 its pres-
ence or absence-and therefore its sufficiency-is irrelevant under
Forrest.
Under these circuits' precedent, Raich applies regardless of
whether a statute contains a jurisdictional element. Debates regard-
ing the sufficiency of a jurisdictional element are moot because the
jurisdictional element itself is meaningless. The Raich principle
should not be used as a means of avoiding the debate as to the consti-
tutional sufficiency ofjurisdictional elements. Flawed reasoning taints
the arguments supporting this approach, further demonstrating that
applying Raich to statutes containing jurisdictional elements is an un-
sound approach in the post-Raich era.
2. Raich Applies to Some Jurisdictional Hooks, but Not Others
At least one court has explicitly stated that some jurisdictional
elements fall within Raich, while others do not.20 1 Possible bases for
distinction-other than the sufficiency of jurisdictional elements,
which will be discussed in Part III.B-include the particular Lopez cat-
egory regulated by the hook (channels of commerce, instrumentali-
ties of commerce, or substantial effect on commerce) and the
congressional intent in inserting the hook. Each of these bases will be
discussed in turn.
a. Distinction Between Categories of Activity Regulated
The Middle District of Pennsylvania has made a distinction based
on the particular Lopez category regulated by the hook. In United
States v. Garcia,20 2 a recent memorandum opinion by the Middle Dis-
198 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
199 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 115 (discussing prior Fourth Circuit cases that
"seem[ ] to amount to an endorsement of the reasoning.., that the mere existence
of the jurisdictional hook is sufficient to protect the statute from a facial challenge"
and that uphold the constitutional sufficiency of the jurisdictional element).
200 Forrest, 429 F.3d at 77 n.1.
201 United States v. Garcia, No. CRIM. 1:04-CR-0301, 2005 WL 1862409 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 5, 2005).
202 2005 WL 1862409.
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trict of Pennsylvania, the district court held that Raich does not apply
to jurisdictional elements regulating the channels of commerce.
20 3
The Garcia court denied a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b), which criminalizes the use of mail or other interstate com-
munications to engage in a sexual crime.204 In response to the defen-
dant's argument that his activity did not substantially affect interstate
commerce, the court wrote that the "constitutional basis for the stat-
ute" is regulation of the channels of commerce, rather than regula-
tion of activity that has a substantial effect on commerce: "The statute
targets conduct involving . . . 'the use of the channels' of interstate
commerce: interstate phone and internet communications. '20 5 The
court stated that proof of interstate economic impact required under
Raich and other "substantial effects" cases such as Lopez and Wickard
does not apply to Congress's power to regulate the channels of com-
merce. 20 6 While the court was not referring to application of the
Raich principle per se, it certainly separated the "channels of com-
merce" category from Raich, suggesting there is some basis for distin-
guishing Raich from cases involving statutes with specific types of
jurisdictional elements. It is likely that the Garcia court would also
separate from Raichjurisdictional elements regulating "instrumentali-
ties of commerce,"20 7 thus leaving only the "substantial effects" hooks
subject to Raich.
Logically, this distinction makes some sense because the jurisdic-
tional hooks requiring that an activity "affect commerce" have been
interpreted to extend to the full reach of Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause, and Raich marks the full reach of that power.
Practically, however, there are at least two problems with this ap-
proach. First, it will have overreaching effects because it does not call
for a case-by-case analysis, which is the very function of a jurisdictional
element. The results of a Raich analysis and a case-by-case analysis,
while both purporting to reach to the edges of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, will not always be the same. This is because while Raich
permits regulation of any intrastate activity that is regulated pursuant
to a comprehensive scheme, jurisdictional elements typically specify
the type of activity that must have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. For example, in the FAA, it is the transaction evidenced in the
203 Id. at *3.
204 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2000)).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See McGimsey, supra note 85, at 1699 ("The channels and instrumentalities
prongs are often referred to in tandem, perhaps reflecting the fact that some cases
can be analyzed under either prong.").
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contract that must "involv[e] commerce." 20 8 In the arson statute, it is
the use of the property that must be "in" or "affecting" interstate com-
merce. 20 9 In addition, when a jurisdictional element is present, the
Supreme Court has advocated narrowing the scope of federal statutes
so as to avoid "constitutional doubts. '2 10 This principle supports
courts' undergoing a case-by-case analysis rather than ignoring ajuris-
dictional element that requires a specific nexus to interstate
commerce.
A second problem also casts doubt on the viability of the distinc-
tion between types of jurisdictional elements. It is often unclear
which Lopez category applies to statutes containing jurisdictional ele-
ments. 21 1 Some statutes, such as the arson statute, purport to reach
more than one category. 212 Even if a jurisdictional element appears
on its face to regulate only one category, courts may interpret it to
reach more than one. For example, courts have applied the FAA's
"involving commerce" language to transactions that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce, as well as to those that arguably fall under
the "channels of commerce" category. 2 13 Because of these practical
problems, courts should avoid attempting to apply the Raich principle
to certain types ofjurisdictional elements while declining to apply it to
others.
b. Distinction Based upon Congressional Motive
Another basis upon which courts could distinguish the applica-
tion of Raich to different jurisdictional elements is the motive of Con-
gress in inserting the jurisdictional element. After the Supreme Court
emphasized the saving power ofjurisdictional hooks in Lopez and Mor-
rison, Congress had a strong incentive to legislate using jurisdictional
hooks to aid in ensuring the facial constitutionality of a statute. The
amendment to the GSFZA is one example of a jurisdictional element
inserted into a statute by Congress to satisfy the Lopez/Morrison test.
2 14
Should courts distinguish between hooks inserted as mere formalities
and hooks that are inserted to serve a meaningful purpose? The diffi-
208 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see supra note 22.
209 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000); see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
210 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
211 See Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear State-
ment Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. R'Ev. 823, 839 (2005). Professor Merrill criticizes the
three-category framework and argues that statutes with jurisdictional elements do not
fall neatly into any of the three categories. Id.
212 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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culty in distinguishing between a textual intent to reach certain activi-
ties and an unwritten motive to insert a hook as a mere formality is
simply unworkable, and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
counsels against such a distinction. This doctrine calls courts to inter-
pret statutes so as to avoid constitutional doubts "'unless such con-
struction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.'
2 15
Disregarding jurisdictional elements based on a purported congres-
sional motive would raise constitutional doubts because applying the
Raich principle may permit the very overreaching of the Commerce
Clause power into intrastate activity that ajurisdictional element is de-
signed to prevent. Further, the very nature of ajurisdictional element
plainly indicates Congress's intent to reach a particular set of activi-
ties. Courts should avoid attempting to distinguish between jurisdic-
tional elements inserted as formalities from those that are intended to
serve a true limiting function. Doing so will avoid constitutional
doubt and respect the plain meaning of Congress's intent.
In practice, distinguishing between jurisdictional elements on
grounds such as the category of activity regulated or the congressional
motive would generate significant problems. Because all constitution-
ally sufficient jurisdictional elements share a similar limiting function,
they should all be permitted to serve that function.
3. Raich Never Applies
On the opposite end of the spectrum from the "Raich always ap-
plies" category, the narrowest view of Raich would hold that Raich has
no application to statutes containing jurisdictional elements. This
would continue the practices of interpreting statutes on an element-
by-element basis and assessing the sufficiency of jurisdictional ele-
ments. 216 No court has thus far embraced this approach-even if
courts have not applied the Raich principle, they have at least cited
Raich to support some form of aggregation or their decision that regu-
lation of a particular activity is constitutional. At this point in the
wake of Raich's jurisprudence, courts are rightfully avoiding complete
disregard of Raich. Until the Supreme Court provides further gui-
dance or declares that Raich clearly does not apply to a given category
of cases, just as it narrowed Lopez and Morrison to facial challenges,
217
215 Fallon, supra note 94, at 23 (emphasis added) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)); see
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
216 See infra Part III.B.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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lower courts will do well to strike a middle ground by paying at least
some deference to Raich without applying its principles blindly.
4. Raich Does Not Apply Directly but Supports a Principle of Aggregation
A middle course between the "always applies" and "never applies"
approaches described previously states that while the Raich principle
does not directly apply to statutes containing jurisdictional elements,
Raich may still be cited for some theory of aggregation or to provide
added support to a case-by-case decision to regulate intrastate activity.
In this way, courts will avoid two pitfalls: they will not blindly apply the
Raich principle, and they will not ignore the effect it may have on
future Commerce Clause jurisprudence. At least until the Supreme
Court provides further guidance or narrows Raich in some way, lower
courts should attempt to strike this middle ground. Like the third
approach, this approach will lead courts to interpret statutes on an
element-by-element basis and assess the sufficiency ofjurisdictional el-
ements. 218 The Second Circuit has taken this approach, and the
Ninth Circuit probably falls into this category. The Ninth Circuit has
stated that Raich may be distinguished from cases involving child por-
nography statutes, suggesting that the jurisdictional element of those
statutes provides the basis for a viable distinction.21
9
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Logan,220 upheld a convic-
tion based on the jurisdictional element in 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which
makes it a crime for one who "maliciously damages or destroys, or
attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire... any building...
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce." 221 Even after Raich, the Second Cir-
cuit applied the two-step inquiry identified in Jones to determine
whether § 844(i)'s jurisdictional element is met: first, the court ascer-
tains the function of the building, and then the court decides whether
that function affects interstate commerce. 222 The court cited Raich to
support application of an earlier precedent holding that rental homes
are part of a class of activities that affect interstate commerce. 223 The
Second Circuit reflects the view that Raich does not directly apply to
218 See infra Part II.B.
219 United States v. Tashbook, 144 F. App'x 610, 613 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 777 (2005).
220 419 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1067 (2006).
221 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
222 Logan, 419 F.3d at 179.
223 Id. at 179-80 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005)).
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statutes containing jurisdictional elements but may be used to support
a theory of narrow aggregation.
224
In two as-applied challenges to statutes containing jurisdictional
elements, the Ninth Circuit has looked to the individual regulated ac-
tivity when determining if the jurisdictional element is satisfied.225 In
United States v. Tashbook,226 the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated, without
explanation, that Raich is distinguishable from the child pornography
cases 227 and therefore it is unnecessary to "address any effect Raich
may have on the current case." 228 The court noted that when Raich
applies, there is a question of whether as-applied challenges are valid
at all.229 The Tashbook court upheld the defendant's conviction under
§ 2251 (a), recognizing the validity of thejurisdictional element 230 and
noting specific facts that supported the requisite nexus to interstate
commerce. 23 1 It is unclear on what basis the Court distinguished the
224 The Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion that is in line with Logan but
that does not so clearly embody the fourth post-Raich approach as to merit inclusion
of the decision in this category. In United States v. Phillips, No. 03-14413, 2006 WL
1117882 (11 th Cir. Apr. 26, 2006), the court looked to specific facts that satisfied the
jurisdictional element in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and then rejected the defendant's argu-
ments as to the sufficiency of the jurisdictional element by citing Raich. Id. at *11
(citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209). Unlike Logan, it is not clear from the Phillips opin-
ion that the court views satisfaction of the jurisdictional element as a prerequisite to
regulation under the statute, particularly in light of the court's opinion in Maxwell.
See id.; supra Part III.A.1.
225 A third case decided by the Ninth Circuit this year took a similar approach with
respect to the Foreign Commerce Clause. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100,
1109-18 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing the case under the relaxed "rational basis" stan-
dard of Raich but explaining extensively why both jurisdictional elements of the stat-
ute at issue were met in this case). This Note has not included Clark in the main text
because the court viewed the "Foreign Commerce Clause independently from its do-
mestic brethren." Id. at 1116.
226 144 F. App'x 610 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 777 (2005).
227 The Ninth Circuit was referring to United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th
Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th
Cir. 2003); and the Tashbook case itself. Tashbook, 144 F. App'x at 613 & n.2.
228 Tashbook, 144 F. App'x at 613 n.2.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 613-14. The Ninth Circuit distinguished its opinion in McCoy, which
held the materials-in-commerce prong was insufficient to guarantee the as-applied
constitutionality of § 2252(a)(4)(B). McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124. The Tashbook court
therefore recognized the validity of the jurisdictional element in the production pro-
vision of § 251(a), reasoning that the production of child pornography "is far more
likely to be 'economic' in nature" than the "'mere possession'" at issue in McCoy
under § 2252(a) (4) (B). Tashbook, 144 F. App'x at 613-14.
231 The court noted that the defendant posted advertisements for his work on the
Internet, communicated with an intrastate child victim by e-mail and telephone, and
pursued victims in other states. Tashbook, 144 F. App'x at 614.
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case from Raich-perhaps either the nature of the statutes at issue or
the presence of the jurisdictional element. 232 Regardless, in the wake
of Raich, Tashbook represents a continued respect for jurisdictional el-
ements and establishes precedent for distinguishing Raich from other
cases, at least those involving child pornography challenges under
§ 2251 (a) and § 2252 (a) (4) (B). This Note includes the Ninth Circuit
in this final category only on the assumption that the distinguishing
basis for the court's opinion was the presence of a jurisdictional ele-
ment in § 2251 (a).
In a later memorandum decision involving an as-applied chal-
lenge to 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (1), the Ninth Circuit provided some affir-
mation that it should fall within this fourth category. The court ruled
that a lower federal court had jurisdiction under the statute because
the defendant's handgun had the requisite nexus with interstate com-
merce-it was manufactured in Germany and imported into Virginia
before reaching California. 233 To support this ruling, the Court cited
Raich with a "cf" signal 234 and described Raich in a parenthetical:
"Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is firmly established." 235 While somewhat vague and sub-
ject to many interpretations,23 6 the citation to Raich and the court's
attention to the specific facts creating a nexus to commerce suggest
the Ninth Circuit was drawing support from the aggregation principle
in Raich without directly applying Raich to § 9 22(q) (1). Thus, at least
one reading of this decision supports placing the Ninth Circuit in this
fourth category based on its Tashbook opinion.
232 If the court distinguished Tashbook on a basis other than the presence of a
jurisdictional element, the Ninth Circuit may hold in the future that Raich does apply
to some statutes containing jurisdictional elements and therefore precludes as-ap-
plied challenges to those statutes. If it distinguished Tashbook on the basis of the
presence of ajurisdictional element, the Ninth Circuit falls squarely within this fourth
category.
233 United States v. Artiaga, 152 F. App'x 636, 637 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 1484 (2006).
234 The "cf" signal indicates that the "[c]ited authority supports a proposition dif-
ferent from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support." THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 47 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
235 Artiaga, 152 F. App'x at 637.
236 Possible interpretations may include the following: (1) Raich applies to statutes
containing jurisdictional elements other than the child pornography statutes identi-
fied in Tashbook; (2) Raich never applies to statutes containing jurisdictional elements
but is worth mentioning; or (3) Raich does not directly apply but provides support for
the principle of aggregation.
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The Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted the soundest ap-
proach for applying Raich to statutes containing jurisdictional ele-
ments. They have found a middle ground by maintaining the purpose
and meaning of jurisdictional elements, while allowing Raich to pro-
vide some support for a decision to aggregate or regulate intrastate
activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
B. Dealing with the Sufficiency Issue when Raich Does Not Directly Apply
If Raich does not apply to statutes containing jurisdictional ele-
ments, 23 7 or only applies to the extent that it supports a principle of
narrow aggregation, 23 8 the question of a jurisdictional element's suffi-
ciency becomes an important issue. In pre-Raich cases holding juris-
dictional elements constitutionally insufficient, courts attempted to
find a substantial relationship between interstate commerce and the
intrastate activity being regulated, utilizing varying degrees of aggrega-
tion.239 In the post-Raich era, courts must consider the impact the
Raich principle may have on their analyses. Does the insufficient juris-
dictional hook shift the statute into the Raich net, thereby permitting
regulation of any intrastate activity, or is a closer nexus required?
When considering these questions, courts must account for the de-
gree of aggregation utilized, congressional intent, and the incentives
their interpretations may give Congress when drafting legislation.
240
This Part identifies three possible approaches for courts dealing
with insufficient jurisdictional elements after Raich. This Part briefly
discusses the first two approaches, both of which would undermine
the meaning and purpose of the jurisdictional hook, and then it ar-
gues that courts should take a third, and more flexible, approach that
gives meaning to jurisdictional hooks and respects congressional
intent.
1. The Strict Sufficiency Rule
The strictest approach would uphold Commerce Clause chal-
lenges whenever ajurisdictional element is insufficient. While this ap-
proach may have been feasible pre-Raich because it would have
provided Congress with an incentive to insert a stronger jurisdictional
element, it is no longer workable post-Raich because now, rather than
inserting stronger jurisdictional elements, it would be simpler and
more efficient for Congress to redraft legislation to eliminate any po-
237 See supra Part III.A.3.
238 See supra Part III.A.4.
239 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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tentially insufficient jurisdictional element.24' This would result in
less precise, hook-less statutes similar to the CSA that fall easily into
the Raich net. The elimination of jurisdictional elements is the oppo-
site result of the one contemplated by the Lopez and Morrison Courts
when they included the presence of a jurisdictional element as a fac-
tor that may support the facial constitutionality of a statute.
242
2. The Blue Pencil Rule
To borrow a term from contract law,24 3 the "blue pencil" rule
would dictate that when ajurisdictional element is insufficient, courts
should not declare the entire provision unconstitutional but should
simply run a blue pencil through the jurisdictional element, essen-
tially striking it from the statute.244 The court could then treat the
statute as though the jurisdictional element never existed and apply
the Raich principle, sweeping in all instances of intrastate activity.
This is essentially what the courts in the "Raich always applies" cate-
gory have done when applying Raich to statutes with jurisdictional
elements.
24 5
This undesirable approach would provide a congressional incen-
tive to insert either a strong jurisdictional element or no jurisdictional
element at all. The blue pencil rule essentially penalizes Congress for
inserting a weak jurisdictional hook; when Congress inserts ajurisdic-
tional hook intended to serve a meaningful limiting function, this lim-
iting function disappears entirely if a court determines that the hook
is insufficient and treats the statute as the Raich court treated the CSA.
The blue pencil rule substitutes the Raich net for a hook simply be-
cause the hook was not strong enough, a result opposite that which
Congress intended in drafting the hook into the statute.
241 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 54-57, 66-69 and accompanying text.
243 See GUENTER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcT 507 (11 th ed. 2003) (explaining
the blue pencil test, which allows courts to sever a contractual promise when "this can
be done by cutting words out of the contract (or by running a blue pencil through the
offending words)").
244 It would be relatively simple for courts to "run a blue pencil" through an insuf-
ficient hook and treat the statute as though the hook never existed. For instance,
courts could sever the FAA's jurisdictional hook in 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000), allowing the
statute to apply to arbitration provisions "in contracts evidencing a transaction,"
rather than "in contracts evidencing a transaction involving commerce."
245 See supra Part III.A.1.
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3. The Flexible Approach
The preferred method, the flexible approach, 246 would retain in-
sufficient jurisdictional elements and give them generous meaning.
Courts would only apply the statute to a given set of circumstances
when it is consistent with pre-Raich precedent to do so, thereby up-
holding the "substantial effects" test to the extent that courts have
done so in the past. This approach would attempt to give jurisdic-
tional elements meaning regardless of their sufficiency, allowing room
for interpretation and consideration of individual circumstances. If a
jurisdictional element is wholly incapable of application, courts would
simply treat the jurisdictional element as though the language read
"substantially affecting commerce," thereby finding a middle ground
between an insufficient hook and the Raich net. For example, if a
court found the "materials-in-commerce" prong of the child pornog-
raphy statutes insufficient, it would reinterpret the language proscrib-
ing the creation of such "visual depiction . . . produced using
materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means"247 to prohibit the creation of
child pornography when "the particular visual depiction substantially
affects interstate or foreign commerce." This interpretation would not
allow merely any line-crossing to suffice. In addition, it would require
that the particular activity at issue (here, the "visual depiction") have a
specific nexus to commerce, rather than allowing the Raich net to
sweep in any intrastate activity simply because Congress could ration-
ally determine that the regulation of child pornography in the aggre-
gate has an effect on interstate commerce.
A pre-Raich decision from the Sixth Circuit 248 illustrates how the
flexible approach would operate in the wake of Raich.2 49 In United
States v. Corp,250 the Sixth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction
for the possession of child pornography under § 2252 (a) (4) (B).
251
246 For purposes of continuing the parallel to contract law, note that the Restate-
ment § 184 has rejected the blue pencil rule in favor of a more flexible method that
allows courts to sever contractual terms and enforce the remainder of the enforceable
terms "if the party who seeks to enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 84 (1981).
247 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) (West Supp. 2005).
248 United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
249 The Sixth Circuit disregarded this case post-Raich when the Sixth Circuit ap-
plied Raich to the child pornography statute in United States v. Gann. See supra text
accompanying notes 184-87.
250 236 F.3d 325.
251 Id. at 333.
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Notwithstanding the wholly intrastate production and possession of
the photographs, the trial court relied on the materials-in-commerce
prong of § 2252 (a) (4) (B) and based federal jurisdiction on the fact
that the photographic paper used to develop the images was manufac-
tured in Germany.2 52 Noting that jurisdictional elements "are to be
read as meaningful restrictions," the Sixth Circuit generously inter-
preted the otherwise-insufficient materials-in-commerce prong to re-
quire a substantial relationship between the defendant's activity and
interstate commerce. 253 Rejecting the overly broad aggregation that a
jurisdictional element seeks to avoid, the court also declined to base
jurisdiction on the "aggregate effect" of intrastate child pornography
as a whole. 2 54 By insisting upon a truly substantial relationship be-
tween the defendant's individual activity and interstate commerce, the
Sixth Circuit in Corp carried out the intended function of the statute's
jurisdictional element to place a meaningful restriction on the stat-
ute's reach.
This flexible approach best enables courts to implement Con-
gress's intent because it allows jurisdictional elements to serve their
intended purpose of placing meaningful limitations on a statute's
reach. Congress has inserted jurisdictional elements in statutes to re-
quire a specific nexus to interstate commerce, and the flexible ap-
proach allows courts to appreciate that nexus. If courts disregarded
any jurisdictional element they deemed insufficient, they would, in ef-
fect, penalize Congress for inserting a weak jurisdiction element by
allowing the Raich net to overshadow meaningful statutory language.
If courts declared the entire statutory provision unconstitutional, they
would thwart Congress's efforts to regulate a particular activity. By
giving jurisdictional elements generous meaning, courts would realize
Congress's goal of requiring a specific nexus to commerce and
thereby maintain the viability of as-applied challenges.
In addition, the flexible approach provides proper incentives for
Congress when legislating. When Congress desires to regulate com-
merce in a particular way, it will do so with precision and will insert a
strong hook that will probably not be found insufficient. Still, the
Raich principle will always give Congress an incentive to omit a juris-
252 Id. at 326-27.
253 Id. at 332.
254 Id. This reluctance to aggregate is preferable to the approach of some pre-
Raich courts that, after finding a jurisdictional element insufficient, sought a relation-
ship between the activity at issue and interstate commerce, but then applied an overly
broad, Wickard-style aggregation theory to establish that relationship, rather than ex-
amining the specific nexus between the defendant's individual activity and interstate
commerce. See supra note 113.
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dictional element altogether, thereby resulting in broad legislation.
To the extent that Congress desires to require a nexus to commerce,
however, the flexible approach allows courts to give Congress's words
meaning within the bounds of the Commerce Clause, even if the juris-
dictional element is insufficient.
C. Summary: The Ideal Combination-A Flexible Hook Analysis with
Minimal Net Support
In summary, the ideal combination of approaches is for courts to:
(1) require case-by-case satisfaction of the jurisdictional hook, distin-
guishing Raich from cases involving statutes with jurisdictional ele-
ments and citing Raich only to support principles of aggregation on a
case-by-case basis; and (2) apply a flexible approach when dealing with
insufficient jurisdictional elements. Rather than applying Raich to ju-
risdictional elements and thereby precluding any case-by-case inquiry
into the regulated activity's nexus to commerce, courts should distin-
guish cases involving statutes with jurisdictional elements to give true
meaning to jurisdictional elements and sustain the viability of as-ap-
plied challenges. Until courts receive further guidance from the Su-
preme Court as to the scope of Raich's applicability, the best approach
is for courts to essentially use the Raich net for minimal support, citing
Raich for principles of aggregation on a case-by-case basis, rather than
ignoring its effect completely. When moving to the next step of deal-
ing with the potential insufficiency of a particular jurisdictional ele-
ment, courts should utilize a more flexible approach to give generous
meaning to jurisdictional elements and account for the circumstances
of the case, rather than disregard the jurisdictional element or declare
the entire statutory provision unconstitutional. The flexible approach
will provide Congress with the appropriate incentives to insert ajuris-
dictional element when it intends for courts to undertake a case-by-
case analysis without penalizing Congress when it inserts a weak juris-
dictional element. The ideal combination of approaches will best pre-
serve the role of the hook, giving Congress a real choice between
casting its Commerce Clause power with the jurisdictional hook or the
regulatory net.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Raich, the viability of the jurisdictional hook is
uncertain. Raich permits Congress to cast a wide regulatory net over
interstate and intrastate activity alike, but unlike the statutory provi-
sion of the CSA in Raich, many statutes contain jurisdictional hooks
requiring a case-by-case nexus to interstate commerce. To give juris-
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dictional elements meaning by allowing them to serve the limiting
function identified in Lopez and Morrison, courts must consider the
implications of the various ways in which Raich may be applied-or
not applied-to statutes containing jurisdictional hooks. The ap-
proach that will allow courts to give jurisdictional hooks their true
meaning is one that declines to apply the Raich principle to statutes
containing jurisdictional hooks, thereby requiring a case-by-case
nexus to commerce and permitting as-applied challenges. Raich may
be cited, however, for principles of narrow aggregation when applying
the typical pre-Raich "substantial effects" test. When a jurisdictional
element's constitutional sufficiency is in question, courts should use a
flexible approach that avoids shifting to a Raich analysis whenever a
court deems ajurisdictional element insufficient. The combination of
these approaches will allow Congress to continue to legislate with two
tools-a regulatory net or a jurisdictional hook-and allow courts to
rely on the Raich net to provide some support to jurisdictional hooks.
In addition, it will give meaning to jurisdictional hooks by ensuring
that each activity regulated under a jurisdictional hook is a "keeper,"
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